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Introduction
On March 4, 2014, seven-year-old Josh Hardy was fighting for his life in the intensive
care unit at St. Jude Children’s Hospital in Tennessee.2 He was suffering from a life-threatening
adenovirus infection and was unable to control the infection because of a weakened immune
system due to complications from a previous cancer treatment.3 His physicians tried to treat the
infection with the then-current standard of therapy, but were unsuccessful, ultimately causing
dialysis-dependent renal failure.4 There was, however, another anti-viral product, brincidofovir,
in Phase III clinical trials at that time that had demonstrated the potential for enhanced antiviral
potency and a more favorable safety profile.5
The drug manufacturer of brincidofovir, Chimerix, began the Phase III clinical trial for
the prevention of reactivation of infections in adult hematopoietic stem cell transplant recipients
in April 2013 and anticipated results to support FDA approval in 2015.6 Doctors at St. Jude
Children’s Hospital twice requested that Chimerix provide brincidofovir for Josh outside of the
clinical trial, since he was ineligible to participate.

Both times the doctors’ requests were

denied.7 In March 2014, Josh’s family posted their story on social media seeking to identify
anyone who could influence Chimerix to change its decision regarding expanded access for
Josh.8
State and national politicians, news channels, TV networks, and private parties called
Chimerix within days to set up interviews about Josh’s story and urged the company to change
its stance.9 Social media criticized Chimerix and its board members so extensively that security
needed to be hired for them because of numerous death threats.10 On March 9, CNN
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aired a segment on Josh’s story.11 The next day Josh’s Twitter page trended in the top five
national stories.12 On March 11, Chimerix announced it would make brincidofovir available to
Josh as part of a 20-patient open-label pilot trial.13 Josh received the experimental drug the next
day and responded well to it.14 He left the hospital by the end of the month nearly virus-free.15
The Josh Hardy case study illustrates the pressing concerns that advocates for expanded
access have with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and manufacturers that block
terminally ill patients from accessing potentially life-saving treatments. Proponents of expanded
use stress that terminally ill patients are prevented from receiving potentially beneficial
treatments because they do not have the luxury of time to wait for ultimate drug approval or the
ability to undergo the lengthy process to obtain expanded access under current FDA
compassionate use options.16 The Goldwater Institute, a conservative nonprofit organization, has
joined other proponents to advocate for expanded access through state “right to try” initiatives.17
Right to Try Laws
This past year, a few states moved to adopt so called “right to try” laws – laws that permit
terminally ill persons, who have exhausted all treatment options, to use investigational drugs,
biological products, or devices without seeking permission from the FDA.18 As of March 2015,
Michigan, Colorado, Louisiana, Missouri, Arizona, Arkansas, and Wyoming have passed such
laws, and over twenty other states may follow.19 The Goldwater Institute has driven the “right to
try” measures state-by-state to allow “terminal patients access to investigational drugs that have
completed basic safety testing through Phase I clinical trials, thereby dramatically reducing
paperwork, wait times and bureaucracy, and, most importantly, potentially saving lives.”20
States that have passed the “right to try” laws have declared that terminally ill patients
have a fundamental right to access available potentially life-saving investigational products
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given the length of the FDA drug approval process and that such patients do not have the luxury
of waiting for a drug during that period.21 The laws provide that the patient, with consultation of
his or her physician, should make the decision for expanded access while taking into account the
potential risks, benefits, and consequences of such use.22
An “eligible patient” for expanded access under these laws is one who has: (1) a terminal
illness, attested by the patient’s physician; (2) considered all other currently approved treatment
options; (3) been unable to participate in a clinical trial within 100 miles of the patient’s home or
has not been accepted to the clinical trial within one week of completion of the clinical trial
application process; (4) received a recommendation from his or her physician for expanded
access; (5) given written, informed consent; and (6) obtained documentation from his or her
physician that he or she is an eligible patient.23 A “terminal illness” is defined as a disease that,
without life-sustaining procedures, will soon result in death or a state of permanent
unconsciousness from which recovery is unlikely.24 An “investigational drug, biological product
or device” is defined as one that has successfully completed Phase I of a clinical trial but has not
yet been FDA approved and remains under investigation in an approved clinical trial.25
The patient must have given written, informed consent in order to have access under the
“right to try” law.26

“Written, informed consent” means a written document signed by the

patient and attested to by the physician that at a minimum: (1) explains the currently approved
treatments for the disease; (2) attests that the patient concurs with his or her physician that all
approved treatments are unlikely to prolong the patient’s life; (3) identifies the specific proposed
investigational product the patient is seeking access to; (4) describes the best and worst outcomes
of using the investigational product, including the most likely outcome and that worse symptoms
might result; (5) makes clear that the patient’s health insurer and provider are not obliged to pay
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for any investigational treatment; (6) makes clear that in-home health care may be denied if
treatment begins; and (7) states that the patient understands that he or she is liable for all
expenses that result from the use of the investigational product and this liability extends to the
patient’s estate unless a contract with the manufacturer states otherwise.27
A manufacturer of the investigational product may make the product available, but is not
required to, under the “right to try” laws.28 The manufacturer may either give the product away
at no cost to the patient or require an eligible patient to pay the manufacturing costs associated
with the investigational product.29 A health insurance carrier may, but is not required to, provide
coverage for the cost of this expanded access.30 The “right to try” laws prohibit a licensing board
from taking any action against a healthcare provider’s license or Medicare certification solely
because of his or her recommendation to an eligible patient regarding expanded access so long as
the recommendation is consistent with medical standards of care.31 Similarly, no cause of action
against a manufacturer or any other entity involved in the care of a patient using the experimental
drug is created by some of these laws as long as the manufacturer exercises reasonable care and
acts in good faith.32 Some of the laws further prohibit any employee or agent of the state from
attempting to block an eligible patient’s access to investigational drugs.33
Ineffectiveness of Right to Try Laws
The Goldwater Institute and other advocates argue that the FDA is the “arbiter of life and
death” for terminally ill patients by standing between the patient and potential for a curative
treatment.34 These advocates strongly believe that patients should be able to exercise their
freedom and personal liberty in attempting to preserve their own lives through available
treatments.35 Ultimately, though, the state “right to try” laws will prove ineffective in making
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expanded access more readily available and could have a detrimental effect on the public health
at large in undercutting the integrity of the drug approval process.
The “right to try” laws will only foster false hope in patients and their families. These
laws do not require a manufacturer to provide an investigational product to a terminally ill
patient, but instead the manufacturer retains discretion.

As such, it is hard to imagine the

manufacturer who would provide a patient an investigational drug under these state laws while
the FDA still prohibits such use and possesses the authority to approve or reject the
manufacturer’s application prior to marketing to the public at large. Although one manufacturer,
Neuralstem, has expressed its support for the state “right to try” laws, it would be surprising to
see other companies follow in its footsteps.36
The solution for how to make such use available outside the clinical trial context is
complex as most people can sympathize with the devastation that occurs when potentially lifechanging drugs are not available for terminally ill patients. Nevertheless, there are concerns in
granting early access to unapproved treatments.

There are apprehensions unique to the

manufacturers of the investigational products, FDA, physicians, and individual patients
regarding expanded access. The “right to try” laws may do more harm than good given these
concerns by taking away the FDA’s authority to regulate expanded access of drugs used by those
most vulnerable.
Currently, a manufacturer must go through the FDA approval process and prove the
safety and efficacy of its product through clinical trials before marketing a drug in the United
States. Expanded access under these laws does away with this oversight, and raises concerns for
drug sponsors. Adverse reactions to the investigational drug may eventually provide the FDA
with reasons to withhold approval of the drug.37 This raises an issue when the adverse event
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results from expanded use where the patient receiving the investigational product is not the
intended patient population to be treated.

Safety issues that arise and threaten patient safety

could cause drug sponsors to end clinical trials before they are completed.38
Manufacturers are also concerned that expanded access will seriously dilute the potential
patients for clinical trials.39 Many patients will have little incentive to enroll in clinical trials and
incur the cost and inconvenience of leaving home to participate in trials if they are able to obtain
experimental drugs on their own through the “right to try” laws.40 Expanded access under these
laws may cause clinical trials to be cost ineffective and could end human clinical studies
altogether. All of these potential consequences would have a negative impact on public health at
large because there is a strong interest in having new drugs developed and tested initially through
randomized and controlled trials rather than in the marketplace where money and lives could be
wasted.41 Furthermore, experience has shown that uncontrolled and un-blinded studies raise
issues of experimenter bias and make it impossible to distinguish the effects of active ingredients
from placebo effects, thereby making it extremely difficult to have an objective analysis of the
efficacy of the drug.42
Additionally, pharmaceutical companies could face liability in a variety of areas where
serious and unforeseen side effects arise in expanded access contexts under the “right to try”
laws.43 Manufacturers could face legal liability in areas like product liability, failure to warn,
fraud, and negligence given the uncertainty surrounding the investigational drug’s safety and a
larger population with access to the drug.44 Liability issues may also arise in the informed
consent context. Advocates for greater regulation claim that it is unlikely that terminally ill
patients, perhaps incapacitated and desperate for their lives, can provide meaningful consent for
access to an experimental drug when the drug has not been adequately tested and adverse
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consequences are not well known.45 Moreover, data from Phase I trials only pertain to twenty to
eighty subjects and reflect likely short-term side effects and maximum dosages.46 This may not
be enough information to comprehend the consequences of taking a drug this early in the testing
period.47 This raises concerns about whether patients with terminal illnesses will be able to fully
comprehend the potential consequences of using an unapproved, experimental treatment.
The “right to try” laws do not consist of statutory preclusion of liability for
manufacturers. The laws preclude liability from physicians who exercise reasonable care in
prescribing the investigational drug. The legal liabilities, then, are on the manufacturer regarding
the unknown risks of the investigational product. Manufacturers are wary to put themselves at
risk with little to no assurance of any form of indemnity for products that have not undergone
rigorous testing for safety and efficacy.48 These “right to try” laws do little to ease these worries.
Manufacturers and entities involved in the distribution process would be violating FDA
regulations that prohibit the sale or marketing of experimental drugs by introducing the
unapproved drugs into interstate commerce for patients under the “right to try” laws.49
Another issue for manufacturers surrounding the availability of investigational products
is cost. Investigational drugs are costly.50 Smaller companies may lack the ability to meet
demand.51 Moreover, a sponsor may recover, at most, only the direct costs of making its
investigational drug available.52 These factors may eventually cause companies to lack the
financial capacities – if they do not already lack the finances – for increased production to make
investigational products available to an increased population under the “right to try” laws.
Both the manufacturers and the FDA have an ethical obligation to ensure that the highest
quality, safest, and most effective products are on the market for the betterment of public health.
Together, they strive to act with compassion towards the dying by not providing patients with
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false hope of a drug that could have adverse side effects. Opponents of expanded access have
argued that allowing expanded access to experimental drugs that have not been tested for their
safety and efficacy is unethical because it offers false hope to a vulnerable group of patients.53
There are many additional concerns from the FDA’s perspective, which may be why the
“right to try” laws circumvent FDA expanded access programs to avoid these issues. The failure
rate of new drug candidates in clinical trials exceeds ninety percent.54 Even drugs that are
approved for market use can cause serious harm to human health. For instance, more people die
annually from legal use of prescription medications than from automobile and workplace
accidents.55 It is evident why the FDA would have concerns regarding expanded access when
even FDA-approved drugs only truly benefit a fraction of the patients who receive them.
Further concerns arise between the distinctions of terminally ill patients versus the
general public at large. What is stopping any person from taking non-FDA approved drugs if
terminally ill patients have a right to experimental drugs under the “right to try” laws? Case law
has found that the FDA's authority to regulate drug safety is no different with respect to dying
patients than it is with nonterminal patients.56 The “right to try” laws raise the possibility that in
the future expanded access may be granted to someone who has a serious but not terminal illness
and eventually the public at large. Concerns arise that if manufacturers do not have to meet the
same standards of the FDA’s current approval process they may not conduct as extensive
research testing the drug’s safety and effectiveness as the FDA had required.57 Instead they may
be tempted to get the drug on the market as fast as they can and risk marketing drugs with
unknown side effects to the public.58 There is the potential for the illness to be worsened to the
point of death if patients have access to new drugs before testing is complete.59 Allowing
patients to try experimental drugs outside of clinical trials risks both the validity of the scientific
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method of the trials and the health of future patients that might benefit from the deliberate,
careful and meticulous process of new drug approval required under FDA regulations.60
A significant concern with the “right to try” laws is that there is no requirement for a
private or government health insurance company to pay for expanded access.

Drugs are not

approved for Medicare or for insurance purposes until after they have completed the FDA
approval process.61 The patient would bear the cost of an experimental drug treatment under the
“right to try” laws if the manufacturer decided to forgo the FDA governance and provide
expanded access. The manufacturing cost allowed to be recovered under the “right to try” laws
can still be extremely costly and prevent many lower-income individuals from being able to
afford the investigational drug. This in turn contradicts the initiative for equal access and leaves
low-income persons with the opportunity to access investigational drugs solely through clinical
trials where they would face the risk of receiving a placebo instead of the desired drug or may
not even be eligible to participate.62
Issues also arise regarding the physicians who prescribe the experimental drugs under the
“right to try” laws. Action against a healthcare provider who recommends treatment using an
investigational product to an eligible patient is prohibited under the “right to try” laws so long as
the recommendation is consistent with the standard of care. The question thus becomes: what
will the standard of care in prescribing experimental drugs be? A physician who refuses to
prescribe such drugs may be liable for medical malpractice if enough physicians prescribe
experimental drugs so that it becomes the standard of care. These laws open the door for
physicians to exploit terminally ill patients by offering medicines that are expensive but have no
realistic benefit.63
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There is also the potential for a patient, who becomes aware of experimental treatment, to
stress the pain of the potential loss of life and demand that he get access to the drug despite his
physician’s belief that it would be inappropriate treatment. Physicians already face considerable
pressure from patients regarding approved drugs that are heavily marketed through direct-toconsumer advertising. There is an additional burden to the risk-benefit discussion between the
physician and patient pertaining to investigational drugs with insufficient data to support the
physician’s opinion regarding safety and efficacy.64
Overall, the “right to try” laws will do little in expanding access to investigational
products outside FDA regulations.

The FDA and manufacturers have a variety of legitimate

concerns that have not been resolved by the “right to try” laws. It would be surprising to find
manufacturers that provide expanded access under these laws that so greatly compromise FDA
regulatory authority when the manufacturers will need FDA approval for their drugs when it
comes time to market to the public at large.
Conclusion
The tension between the urgency for expanded access to provide potentially beneficial
treatment to dying patients and the concerns of the FDA and industry in regulating when and
what treatments will be safe and effective enough for investigational use has existed for decades.
What is evident is that the state “right to try” laws are not the answers to the legitimate
apprehensions of the FDA and manufacturers.

Those new laws do nothing to require

manufacturers to provide the investigational drugs to eligible terminally ill patients. Regulators
should continue to seek a balance between supporting the needs of terminally ill patients with the
responsibility of the FDA and manufacturers to provide the most safe and effective products for
the public at large. Potential improvements to the current expanded access programs must
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receive FDA support and involve collaboration with the agency in the interest of encouraging
manufacturers to more willingly provide access to the investigational products.
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